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affects the United Kingdom (UK) economy and the production patterns of multinational 
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1. Introduction 
 
As the global economy has become increasingly interdependent, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) form multilateral production networks, where production processes are subdivided 
into several stages and different countries have been participating in specific parts of these 
networks. In this environment, the United Kingdom (UK) decided to leave the European 
Union (EU). On March 29, 2017, the prime minister of Great Britain, Theresa May, signed 
a letter that will trigger the British exit from the EU (Brexit) within two years. The UK is 
the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the EU, with almost half of the 
FDI coming from other EU countries (Global Counsel 2015; UK Trade & Investment 
2016). At a global level, the UK is the third highest recipient of FDI after the United States 
(US) and China (Simionescu 2016). The purpose of this paper is to explore how Brexit 
could affect the production patterns of MNEs that choose the UK as a destination market or 
as a gateway to the EU market. 
     While there has been extensive research on the activities of MNEs since the late 
1980s, a limited number of studies have combined every operational strategy of MNEs into 
one model. The export-platform especially is not much discussed in the theoretical studies, 
even though empirical studies have shown its importance. Since the UK plays a significant 
role for MNEs as a gateway to the EU market, the analytical model for this study must 
include this type in addition to the typical horizontal- and vertical-type MNEs. 
     One of the most sophisticated studies to consider typical types of MNEs while 
including export-platforms in one consistent analytical framework was presented by 
Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007). Using a numerical simulation model in which two 
market countries and one exogenously given developing country are considered, they 
explored conditions under four types of firm strategy while gradually changing two types of 
costs, one for trading components and the other for assembling components. However, their 
model has only one factor of production, and the non-market country is assumed to set 
exogenous factor pricing in a partial equilibrium framework. Another work that nests every 
type of MNE in one model is presented by Ito (2013). Extending the two-region, 
four-country (two countries in each region) model developed by Navaretti and Venebles 
(2004) to include export-platform, he showed that a reduction in trade costs, either 
inter-regional or intra-regional, induces firms to choose the export-platform rather than 
other types. To enable the theoretical model to yield testable hypotheses for empirical 
testing, he incorporated only trade costs while abstracting away production costs. 
     A good candidate for the base of an analytical framework that includes both trade and 
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production costs in a general equilibrium setting is the knowledge-capital model developed 
by Markusen (1997) and further extended by Zhang and Markusen (1999). Their 
computational model is able to verify the effects of changes in firm-type on factor prices in 
the countries where the MNEs are active, although export-platform is not taken into 
account. Oyamada (2016) extended this original model to develop a new version that 
includes two types of export-platform that operate in two non-market countries. This study 
utilizes this version of the knowledge-capital model. 
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the major 
assumptions of the extended knowledge-capital model. In Sections 3 and 4, we perform 
simulations and report on results that reveal which type of firms would be active under the 
Brexit scenario and how selected economic indicators including welfare are affected. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes this study. 
 
 
2. The Extended Knowledge-Capital Model 
 
The model used in this study is a simple extension of the knowledge-capital model 
originally developed by Markusen (1997). This model is extended to include six types of 
operational strategies: national enterprises (NEs); horizontal MNEs (HMNEs); vertical 
MNEs (VMNEs); horizontal export-platforms (HEPs); vertical export-platforms (VEPs); 
and complexly integrated MNEs (CMNEs). In addition to the original assumption of two 
market countries in which MNE are established and there are markets for the commodity 
produced by these MNEs, the model also includes two non-market countries, in which the 
final assembly process of multinational production may take place while the finished 
products are exported rather than sold locally. 
There are the four countries (A, B, C, and D) indexed as r, three types of goods (X, Y, 
and Z), as well as two kinds of production factors, skilled labor (K) and unskilled labor (L). 
A and B are assumed to be the market countries indexed as i or j, which are subsets of r, 
while C and D are the non-market countries indexed as w, another subset of r. The 
production factors K and L are immobile among national boundaries. X is the intermediate 
good (a component) produced only in the home of the MNE, country i, and is sent to 
country r where the final assembly of Y takes place. This sector exhibits increasing returns 
to scale (IRTS) so that the market in country j for the finished product Y is assumed to be 
imperfectly competitive. All MNEs in each production type, national N, horizontal H, 
vertical V, horizontal export-platform EH, vertical export-platform EV, and complex 
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integration CI share identical technologies and productivity. In contrast, Z is the regular 
good produced by the non-MNE with a constant-returns-to-scale technology so that its 
market is perfectly competitive. Z is produced in every country r, and sold on the 
international market as a perfect substitute. 
     In the IRTS sector, two types of fixed costs (F and G) are required to start operating a 
firm. While G, measured in units of unskilled labor L, is needed to set up an assembly plant 
in country r (country specific), F, measured in units of skilled labor K, is required to 
establish a firm and its local subsidiary to operate on a trade-link between the home and a 
foreign country (firm-type/trade-link specific). There are trade costs (transportation costs 
and import tariffs) for the international transport of X and Y, which are specific to each 
trade link. We assume that unskilled labor L in the exporting country is used for 
transportation. On the other hand, it is assumed for simplicity that shipping Z does not 
generate any cost. 
     In this environment, there are two groups of firms producing Y. One is established 
and headquartered in country A and the other in B (country i). The markets for Y are limited 
to countries A and B (country j). Good Y is produced in two stages with IRTS technology 
by imperfectly competitive firms. In the first stage, each firm produces its components (the 
intermediate good) X only in its home country using skilled labor K. In the second stage, a 
firm sends its components to domestic and/or foreign subsidiaries to finalize the production 
of Y there, assembling components X using locally hired unskilled labor L. This assembly 
process can take place in any country r. If the assembly is taking place in a non-market 
country w, all of the final products are exported to one or both of the market countries j. If it 
is performed in the home country i, the products are sold domestically and/or exported to a 
foreign market j. If it takes place in a foreign market country i, the products are sold locally 
and/or exported back to the home market j. 
     There are both firm-level and plant-level scale economies. A production regime, 
which refers to a combination of firm types in an equilibrium, is determined by the free 
entry and exit of firms in each operational pattern. Regimes will be denoted by suffixes 
with letters, with the first letter referring to a firm’s home country i, the second referring to 
the destination market j, and the third referring to the location of its assembly plant (i or w). 
When it is possible to omit some of these letters without creating confusion, the length of 
the suffix becomes shorter. The regimes are categorized into six types, N, H, V, EH, EV, 
and CI, with each expressing the production pattern of a firm. The six production types are 
defined as follows. 
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Type-N: NEs that maintain a single plant with headquarters in country i. This type of firms 
produces both components X and final products Y in country i. A fraction of the production 
of product Y may or may not be exported to country j. 
 
Type-H: HMNEs that maintain plants in both market countries, with headquarters in 
country i. This type of firm produces components X in country i, some of which are 
shipped to an assembly plant in country j. The final products Y are produced in both market 
countries. No fraction of product Y may be exported. 
 
Type-V: VMNEs that maintain a single plant in the foreign market country j, with 
headquarters in country i. This type of firm produces components X in country i, which are 
then shipped to the assembly plant in country j. A fraction of the products Y may or may not 
be exported back to the home market in country i. 
 
Type-EH: HEPs that maintain a plant in one of the non-market countries w, in addition to a 
plant and headquarters in home country i. This type of firms produces components X in 
country i, some of which are shipped to an assembly plant in country w. All of the final 
product Y produced in country w is exported to the foreign market in country j, while 
products produced in the home country are sold domestically. 
 
Type-EV: VEPs that maintain a single plant in one of the non-market countries w, with 
headquarters in country i. This type of firm produces component X in country i, which is 
then shipped to the assembly plant in country w. All of the final product Y is exported to 
both of the market countries j. 
 
Type-CI: CMNEs that maintain plants both in one of the non-market countries w and in the 
foreign market country j, with headquarters in country i. This type of firm produces 
component X in country i, which is then shipped to the assembly plant in countries w and j. 
All of the final product Y produced in country w is exported back to the home market in 
country i, while that produced in the foreign market country is sold locally. 
 
     Figure 1 illustrates these six types of production patterns. In each pattern, the 
headquarters of the firm is located in the country placed on the left-hand side of the image. 
     In experimental simulations, we change the relative factor endowments for either the 
market- or non-market-country groups, given absolute levels of total endowments for the 
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group. The factor endowments for the group not being focused on are kept identical for the 
two countries in the group to avoid complexities in interpreting the results. Then, a box 
diagram à la Edgeworth box is drawn placing the total skilled labor endowment for the 
focused group on one axis and the total unskilled labor endowment on another axis to 
capture the regime, welfare level, factor prices, and so on in each cell corresponding to the 
relative factor endowments of the two countries. The full set of the system of equations and 
inequalities that solves for an equilibrium is presented in Oyamada (2016). 
 
 
Figure 1: Six Types of Production Patterns 
 
     Assumptions on the levels of fixed costs and their relationships play a crucial role in 
the predictions of the model. We made the following four assumptions on the 
firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost F for a firm established in country A: 
 2ܨ஺ே ൐ ܨ஺஺ு ൅ ܨ஺஻ு ൐ ܨ஺ே,      (1) 
 ܨ஺஺஼ூ ൒ ܨ஺஺ாு ൒ ܨ஺஺ு ൐ ܨ஺ே ൐ ܨ஺஺ா௏ ൒ ܨ஺஺௏ ,    (2) 
 ܨ஺஻ு ൌ ܨ஺஻௏ ൌ ܨ஺஻஼ூ ൐ ܨ஺஼ாு ൌ ܨ஺஽ாு ൌ ܨ஺஼ா௏ ൌ ܨ஺஽ா௏ ൌ ܨ஺஼஼ூ ൌ ܨ஺஽஼ூ , (3) 
and 
 ܨ஺஺஼ூ ൅ ܨ஺஻஼ூ ൅ ܨ஺஼஼ூ ൌ ܨ஺஺஼ூ ൅ ܨ஺஻஼ூ ൅ ܨ஺஽஼ூ ൐ ܨ஺஺ு ൅ ܨ஺஻ு  
 ൐ ܨ஺஺ாு ൅ ܨ஺஼ாு ൌ ܨ஺஺ாு ൅ ܨ஺஽ாு ൒ ܨ஺஺௏ ൅ ܨ஺஻௏  
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 ൐ ܨ஺஺ா௏ ൅ ܨ஺஼ா௏ ൌ ܨ஺஺ா௏ ൅ ܨ஺஽ா௏ ൐ ܨ஺ே.    (4) 
The case for a firm established in country B is the same. Relation (1) is based on the 
joint-input characteristic of knowledge-based services that enables simultaneous use in 
multiple production facilities. The cost for an additional plant may be reduced. Relation (2) 
is related to the headquarter cost. First, a type-H firm is more expensive compared with a 
type-N firm because additional skilled labor is required at headquarters for managerial and 
coordination activities. Second, the additional cost of managerial and coordination activities 
for the operation of a local subsidiary might be higher in a non-market country (type-EH 
and type-CI) than in a market country (type-H). A similar relationship applies to type-V and 
type-EV firms. Third, a type-N firm is costly compared to a type-V or type-EV firm 
because the latter may hire local skilled labor to train unskilled labor in the host country. 
Relation (3) is related to the local affiliate cost. In non-market countries, cheaper skilled 
labor is available. Relation (4) is related to the total cost. Type-V and type-EV firms are less 
costly compared to type-H and type-EH firms because the former has only one assembly 
plant in a non-market country and additional payment for managerial coordination activities 
is therefore not required. Among type-H and type-EH firms, we assume that operating an 
assembly plant is more costly in a market country than in a non-market country. A similar 
relationship applies to type-V and type-EV firms. The most costly firm is the type-CI 
because this type operates its headquarters and two assembly plants in three different 
countries. Relation (4) also implies that technology transfer incurs some amount of cost so 
that fragmentation is not perfect. 
     One point to note is that we presume the plant-level production of the type-Y good is 
less skilled-labor intensive than that of the type-Z, which represents the composite of all 
kinds of commodities, unlike the original theory (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 2001:694; 
Markusen 2002:133). Based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 9A Data Base 
for 2011 (Hertel 1997), shares of skilled-labor in the total labor inputs with respect to the 
manufacturing sector, primary industries, and services are 37.837%, 56.795%, and 
48.707%, respectively, in the 24 countries in which the world's top 100 non-financial 
MNEs for 2015 (UNCTAD 2016) are established, and the overall production in the rest of 
the world.1 The countries with the top 100 investors can be regarded as the market 
                                                     
1 The 24 countries are: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, United States, 
Mexico, Brazil, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, and Israel. If we also include the top 100 investors from 
developing and transition economies, 12 countries are added to the previous 24. Those are the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, India, Argentina, Venezuela, Russian Federation, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, and South Africa. While Algeria should also be included, it is not separately available in the 
GTAP 9A Data Base. In the latter case, shares of skilled-labor with respect to the three sectors become 
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countries in this study, while the countries without are the non-market countries. Assuming 
that MNEs mainly reside in the manufacturing sector, we can then stipulate the 
skilled-labor intensity of activities as: 
 ௜ܺ (Headquarters Only) 
 ൐ ௜ܺ ൅ ௥ܻ (Integrated Production of Type-Y) 
 ൐ ܼ௥ (Production of Type-Z) 
 ൐ ௥ܻ (Plant Only). 
This assumption on factor-intensity significantly affects the simulation results we will see 
later. While MNEs are considered in many cases as more skilled-labor intensive than local 
firms in developing countries, we suspect that the hypothesis holds only within the same 
industrial category. 
     Various operational patterns appear under different characteristics of the countries. 
When two market countries are similar in both size and relative endowment, type-H firms 
established in both market countries prevail. If the market countries differ in size while 
being similar in relative endowment, type-N firms established in the country with abundant 
factors dominate the production and occupy both markets. When the price of unskilled 
labor in a market country becomes cheaper, foreign type-H firms become active. If the price 
of unskilled labor becomes extremely high, firms established in the country move to other 
market countries as type-V firms. In this environment, MNEs never establish plants in 
non-market countries but instead go straight to market countries as type-N, type-H, or 
type-V firms if non-market countries are similar in relative endowment. The reason for this 
is that there is no substantial difference between relative factor prices among the 
non-market countries. On the other hand, type-EV firms become active if cheaper unskilled 
labor is available in either of the non-market countries. For instance, type-EV firms from 
both countries A and B operate in C when unskilled labor is relatively abundant in country 
C. Type-EH firms tend to arise in non-market countries where both low-trade-cost access to 
the final market and cheap unskilled labor is available. One example of this is the 
construction of factories in a free trade area to serve the markets of other members of the 
free trade agreement (FTA) while avoiding import tariffs. Type-CI firms emerge under a 
particular condition in which a market country and a non-market country liberalize trade in 
an environment in which the transportation cost of components is low while the cost of 
finished products concerning the trade-link between market countries is high. An example 
of a low transportation cost of components is the use of the internet to send blue prints from 
                                                                                                                                                           
37.316%, 56.385%, and 48.616%, respectively. Hence, the ranking of skilled-labor intensity of activities does 
not change. 
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headquarters to a local affiliate. 
 
 
3. The Effects of BREXIT on FDI in the UK as a Destination Market 
 
We now examine the potential effects of Brexit when the UK is considered as a destination 
market. As mentioned in Section 1, almost half of the inward FDI to the UK was from other 
EU countries. This kind of FDI from the EU area may not be for the purpose of building 
export-platforms but solely to serve the UK market. Therefore, the operational strategy of 
MNEs will be type-H or type-V. Suppose two market countries A and B are one of the EU 
countries, which is investing to the UK, and the UK, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2: Operational Patterns when Import Tariff Is Low (Market Countries) 
 
     Then, let us examine Figure 2, a box diagram for the case when relative factor 
endowments for the two market countries are changed given the absolute levels of total 
endowments. To simulate the situation when the UK is still a member of the EU, import 
tariff rates levied on both the component X and the final product Y traded between 
countries A and B are set to zero. This will be the base case for comparison with the results 
obtained when a set of parameters or exogenous variables are changed. The vertical axis 
corresponds to the total endowment of skilled labor for the two market countries, and the 
horizontal axis to that of unskilled labor. The division of the factor endowments between 
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the two countries is shown with country A measured from the southwest corner and country 
B measured from the northeast corner. The model is repeatedly solved for each cell 361 
(19ൈ19) times, altering the distribution of factor endowments. Each cell represents an 
equilibrium regime and the number inside shows which type of firm is active in the regime. 
The regime number is defined as: 
 ߗ ൌ ߱஺ே ൅ ߱஻ே ൅ ߱஺ு ൅ ߱஻ு ൅ ߱஺௏ ൅ ߱஻௏ ൅ ߱஺஼ாு ൅ ߱஺஽ாு ൅ ߱஻஼ாு ൅ ߱஻஽ாு 
     ൅߱஺஼ா௏ ൅ ߱஺஽ா௏ ൅ ߱஻஼ா௏ ൅ ߱஻஽ா௏ ൅ ߱஺஼஼ூ ൅ ߱஺஽஼ூ ൅ ߱஻஼஼ூ ൅ ߱஻஽஼ூ , 
where 
 ߱஺ே ൌ 1000 if type-N firms established in country A are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻ே ൌ 100 if type-N firms established in country B are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺ு ൌ 2000 if type-H firms established in country A are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻ு ൌ 200 if type-H firms established in country B are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺௏ ൌ 4000 if type-V firms established in country A are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻௏ ൌ 400 if type-V firms established in country B are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஼ாு ൌ 10 if type-EH firms established in country A operating in country C 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஽ாு ൌ 20 if type-EH firms established in country A operating in country D 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஼ாு ൌ 1 if type-EH firms established in country B operating in country C 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஽ாு ൌ 2 if type-EH firms established in country B operating in country D 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஼ா௏ ൌ 0.1 if type-EV firms established in country A operating in country C 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஽ா௏ ൌ 0.2 if type-EV firms established in country A operating in country D 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஼ா௏ ൌ 0.01 if type-EV firms established in country B operating in country C 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஽ா௏ ൌ 0.02 if type-EV firms established in country B operating in country D 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஼஼ூ ൌ 0.001 if type-CI firms established in country A operating in country C 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஽஼ூ ൌ 0.002 if type-CI firms established in country A operating in country D 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஼஼ூ ൌ 0.0001 if type-CI firms established in country B operating in country C 
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  are active, otherwise 0; and  
 ߱஻஽஼ூ ൌ 0.0002 if type-CI firms established in country B operating in country D 
  are active, otherwise 0. 
The situation in which firms established in one of the EU countries (country A) are 
investing in the UK as type-H or type-V is expressed with the number 2000, 3000, 4000, 
5000, 6000, or 7000. The cells with those numbers show up in the northwestern half of 
Figure 2. Those firms are investing in the UK for the purpose of hiring relatively cheap 
unskilled labor compared with their home country. 
 
 
Figure 3: Operational Patterns when Import Tariff Is High (Market Countries) 
 
     In this environment, Brexit can be simulated through increases in import tariff rates 
on the trade between countries A and B. This is depicted by Figure 3. Notice that the cells 
with 2000 and 3000 increase, leaving the cells with 4000 and 5000 around the northwest 
corner unchanged. This implies that Brexit will not reduce FDI but increase type-H MNEs. 
Outward FDI from the UK to the EU also increases (numbered 200). Thus, Brexit may 
encourage firms in the EU to change their strategy from type-V to type-H, and firms in the 
UK from type-N to type-H. As long as the UK is attractive as a final market, Brexit will not 
reduce inward FDI to the UK but rather increase type-H activities between the UK and EU. 
It also works for the non-EU partners. If demand for consumption in the UK continues, 
firms from any country will continue investing as type-H to serve the UK market, 
regardless of Brexit. 
0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 (B)
0.95 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 5000.0000 5000.0000 5000.0000 5000.0000 5000.0000 7000.0000 7000.0000 3000.0000 1000.0000 1000.0000 0.05
0.90 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 5000.0000 5000.0000 7000.0000 7000.0000 7000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 1000.0000 1400.0000 0.10
0.85 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 5000.0000 7000.0000 7000.0000 7000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1400.0000 0.15
0.80 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 7000.0000 7000.0000 7000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3000.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1600.0000 0.20
0.75 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 6000.0000 6000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1600.0000 0.25
0.70 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 6000.0000 6000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1600.0000 0.30
0.65 4000.0000 4000.0000 4000.0000 6000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1200.0000 1600.0000 0.35
0.60 4000.0000 4000.0000 6000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2000.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1200.0000 1600.0000 0.40
0.55 4000.0000 4000.0000 6000.0000 2100.0000 2100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1200.0000 1600.0000 400.0000 0.45
0.50 5000.0000 6000.0000 2100.0000 2100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1200.0000 1200.0000 600.0000 500.0000 0.50
0.45 4000.0000 6100.0000 2100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 3200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 1200.0000 1200.0000 600.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.55
0.40 6100.0000 2100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 3200.0000 1200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 600.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.60
0.35 6100.0000 2100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 600.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.65
0.30 6100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 600.0000 600.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.70
0.25 6100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 200.0000 600.0000 600.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.75
0.20 6100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 2300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 700.0000 700.0000 700.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.80
0.15 4100.0000 2100.0000 2300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 700.0000 700.0000 700.0000 500.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.85
0.10 4100.0000 100.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 300.0000 700.0000 700.0000 700.0000 500.0000 500.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.90
0.05 100.0000 100.0000 300.0000 700.0000 700.0000 500.0000 500.0000 500.0000 500.0000 500.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 400.0000 0.95
0.00 (A) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
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Figure 4: Effects of Raising Import Tariff Rates (Country B) 
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Figure 5: Effects of Reducing Fixed Cost F (Country B) 
 
     FDI does not decrease, but what are the effects on welfare? Figure 4 captures the 
effects of raising import tariff rates levied on the trade between countries A and B. The top 
panel captures the effects on welfare, the middle the price of skilled labor, and the bottom 
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the price of unskilled labor, respectively in country B (the UK). In the panels, we are 
standing on the origin for country B, which corresponds to the northeast corner of the 
previously shown box diagrams. 
     Unexpectedly, the UK will be better off after Brexit if the country is moderately 
smaller than the partner country. Since the UK likely has a smaller relative endowment of 
skilled or unskilled labor compared with the EU or other market countries, the peaks 
around the left and the right corners are ignored at this time. The improvement in welfare is 
brought about by the increase in disposable income from the appreciation of the price of 
unskilled labor. The increases in import tariff rates after Brexit encourage firms to adopt a 
horizontal strategy so that demand for local unskilled labor increases and pushes its price up 
if the inward FDI mainly expands, or demand for the local skilled labor increases if the 
outward FDI increases compared to inward FDI, under the present assumption of 
skilled-labor intensity among activities. In general, income increases/decreases due to 
Brexit when the UK is relatively smaller/larger than the partner. 
     In cases when the depreciation of the price of unskilled labor causes a problem, 
efforts such as reducing the firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost F, improving or 
developing infrastructures, may help. Since the fixed cost F is the cost of the managerial 
and coordination activities for the operation of a local affiliate, which requires skilled labor, 
the reduction of this cost saves the factor input so that its price depreciates. In turn, the cost 
reduction brings in inward FDI that hires more unskilled labor. Consequently, disposable 
income increases through the appreciation of the price of unskilled labor, improving 
welfare. Figure 5 captures this process. 
 
 
4. The Effects of BREXIT on FDI in the UK as a Gateway to the EU 
Market 
 
In this section, we examine the potential effects of Brexit when the UK is a gateway to the 
EU market. This type of FDI is included in inward FDI to the UK from non-EU countries 
that is not for the purpose of serving the UK market. The operational strategy of MNEs will 
therefore be type-EH or type-EV. Suppose two non-market countries C and D are the UK 
and a non-EU country adjacent to the EU market, respectively. The market countries A and 
B are assumed to be an EU country and a non-EU market country, such as the US, Japan, or 
China. 
     Figure 6 is a box diagram for the case when relative factor endowments for the two 
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non-market countries are changed given the absolute levels of total endowments. To 
simulate the situation when the UK is still a member of the EU, import tariff rates levied on 
both the component X and the final product Y traded between countries A and C are set to 
zero. Analogous to the case of market countries, the division of the factor endowments 
between the two non-market countries is shown with country C measured from the 
southwest corner and country D measured from the northeast corner. The situation wherein 
firms established in one of the non-EU market countries (country B) are investing in the 
UK as type-EH or type-EV is expressed with the number 1 or 0.01. While the cells with 
those numbers show up around the southeastern corner of Figure 6, the type-EV may not be 
the case this time because it is not realistic to treat the UK as an extremely 
unskilled-labor-abundant country. We therefore focus on the orange colored area along the 
neighborhood of the southwest-northeast diagonal. 
 
 
Figure 6: Operational Patterns when Import Tariff between Countries A and C Is Low 
(Non-Market Countries) 
 
     In this environment, Brexit is simulated through increases in import tariff rates on the 
trade between countries A and C. This is depicted in Figure 7. Notice that the cells with 1 
completely disappear. This implies that the UK is no longer attractive as a gateway to the 
EU market and MNEs established in country B will change their strategy to build affiliate 
plants in the EU countries while withdrawing export-platforms from the UK. Thus, Brexit 
may encourage firms to go straight to the destination market as type-H. 
0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 (D)
0.95 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.05
0.90 0.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.10
0.85 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.15
0.80 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.20
0.75 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.25
0.70 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.30
0.65 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.35
0.60 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.40
0.55 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.45
0.50 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 0.50
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0.35 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2001.0000 2001.0000 2001.0000 2001.0000 2001.1000 0.65
0.30 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2001.0000 2001.0000 2001.0000 2001.1000 2001.1000 2001.1000 2001.1000 0.70
0.25 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2001.0000 2001.0000 2001.1000 2001.1000 2001.1000 2101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 0.75
0.20 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2001.0000 2001.1000 2001.1000 2001.1000 2101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 0.80
0.15 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2001.0000 2001.1000 2001.1000 2001.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1100 101.1100 0.85
0.10 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2001.0000 2001.1000 2001.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1000 101.1100 101.1100 100.1100 100.1100 100.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.90
0.05 2200.0000 2201.0000 2201.0000 2001.1000 2101.1000 2301.1000 301.1000 301.1100 301.1100 100.1100 100.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.1100 0.95
0.00 (C) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
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Figure 7: Operational Patterns when Import Tariff between Countries A and C Is Raised 
(Non-Market Countries) 
 
     The effects of raising import tariff rates levied on the trade between countries A and 
C on the welfare and the prices of skilled and unskilled labor in country C (the UK) are 
shown in Figure 8. In the panels, we are standing on the origin for country C, which 
corresponds to the southwest corner of the box in Figure 6 or 7. Ignoring the area next to 
the right corner where unskilled labor is extremely abundant, country C will be worse off. 
After the complete withdrawal of the type-EH export-platform from country C, demand for 
unskilled labor falls such that the price of the factor depreciates, thereby lowering 
disposable income. Although the relative price of skilled labor appreciates, it is not enough 
to offset the reduction in the income from unskilled labor. 
     Since the level of trade costs plays a significant and crucial role in the firms' decision 
making when deciding whether to setup export-platforms in a country adjacent to the target 
market, long distances between the firms' home country and the target country can cause 
the trade cost burden to become relatively heavy when direct access is committed. The cost 
saving policy of reducing the firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost F will therefore not 
help in this case. To cover the loss from the reduction in the number of export-platforms 
serving for the EU market after Brexit, efforts to increase horizontal FDI and increase its 
attractiveness as a destination market would be a solution in the short-run. Seeking new free 
trade agreements or economic partnership programs with both EU and non-EU countries 
0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 (D)
0.95 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 0.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.05
0.90 0.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.10
0.85 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.2200 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.15
0.80 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.20
0.75 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.25
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0.65 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.35
0.60 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 2200.0000 0.40
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will work in the long-run. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Effects of Raising Import Tariff Rates (Country C) 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper explored how Brexit potentially affects the UK economy and the production 
patterns of MNEs that choose the UK as a destination market or as a gateway to the EU 
market. Utilizing an extended version of the knowledge-capital model that includes six 
types of firms and four countries grouped into market and non-market in a general 
equilibrium framework, a simulation analysis revealed the following points. 
 
1. Brexit will encourage firms in both the EU and the UK to change their strategy to 
incorporate horizontal-type affiliates. As long as the UK is attractive as a final 
market, Brexit will not reduce inward FDI to the UK. 
 
2. In contrast, export-platforms serving the EU market owned by the firms in non-EU 
countries will completely withdraw by Brexit. To cover the loss from the reduction 
in the number of export-platforms, efforts to increase horizontal FDI and increase  
attractiveness as a destination market would be a solution in the short-run, while 
new free-trade agreements or economic partnership programs with both EU and 
non-EU countries will help in the long-run. 
 
     There are several potentially important issues that we have not yet taken into account 
in our analytical framework. First, the present model is not built on any kind of real data, so 
all of values of the parameters and exogenous variables are artificial. In the present situation, 
a great deal of imagination is needed in analyzing the simulation results. Second, the 
present framework does not allow us to handle a situation in which a country is both a 
destination market and a gateway to another market at the same time. We therefore divided 
the analysis into two parts from the standpoint of the UK's role in its relationships with EU 
countries. Although dealing with this problem may give rise to further complications, it is 
worth making efforts to find a solution. Third, the present model does not consider any 
spillover effects from inward FDI that may contribute to enhancing long-run growth rates. 
The inclusion of such positive effects will change the simulation results to some degree. 
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